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The Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the U.N. and Overthrow Saddam Hussein

It's an honor and privilege to be here tonight to speak with you about a subject that, tragically, is not a pleasant one to talk about, and that's the situation in Iraq. The reason why I'm here tonight isn't to deliver a soliloquy or a monologue—you've probably had too much of that. I want to initiate a process of debate, discussion and dialogue. It's sadly lacking in America today.

Whether you agreed with my position before the war is irrelevant. What we all need to agree on is that there wasn't enough debate, discussion and dialogue about the situation in Iraq, about American foreign policy objectives, and more particularly about what the genuine policy objectives of the Bush administration were vis-à-vis Iraq before we sent the men and women who honor us by wearing the uniform of the armed services of the United States of America into harm's way. We owe it to these people, we owe it to over 2,100 who have died, we owe it to over 15,000 who have been wounded and we owe it to the over 160,000 who continue to be deployed in harm's way. We owe it to them to ensure that before we send them off in a situation where they will be called upon to sacrifice their lives for their country, that it is a cause worthy of that sacrifice.

Now, the president of the United States told the American people, told the Congress of the United States, told the international community, that a threat existed in Iraq, a threat in the form of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and long-range ballistic missiles. [This was] an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States and, indeed, the security of the international community. The president also noted that Iraq had failed to comply with its obligation under several Security Council Resolutions to disarm, and that the United Nations had proven unable or unwilling to hold Iraq to account, that the president had no choice, therefore, but to move forward unilaterally and remove Saddam Hussein from power in order to ensure that this threat that existed in the form of weapons of mass destruction was done away with once and for all. Remember the president's words: If Saddam Hussein does not want to disarm, then I will lead a coalition of the willing to Iraq and disarm the dictator by removing him from power.

I would like to submit to you tonight...that the United States, in dealing with Iraq, has never had a policy of disarmament. But... instead has a purported policy of regime change and this is not unique to the current Bush administration

Now, it's interesting. We've talked about the president's words, there are a couple of themes that play here. One theme is disarmament—the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the need to remove them. But there's that other theme out there: regime change—removing Saddam Hussein from power. What I would like to submit to you tonight for your consideration is that the United States of America, in dealing with Iraq, has never had a policy of disarmament. But the United States of America instead has a purported policy of regime change and this is not unique to the current Bush administration, this is a policy of regime change that has been in place and in play since 1991. That means the presidency of the administration of George Herbert Walker Bush. It is a policy of regime change that was inherited by the Clinton administration and actively pursued by the Clinton administration for its eight-year tenure, and George W. Bush inherited this policy in turn and took it to its current manifestation. Now, certain people would say, “Well, that's a difficult piece of logic for us to chew on and accept. How would you back that up?” Here I go.

When you talk about disarming Iraq there is a mandate set forth by the Security Council of the United Nations. It's Resolution 687, passed by the United Nations in April 1991. A couple of years ago I graduated from college and one of the best courses I had in college was on treaty history. I had a professor who handed me a treaty and said, read the treaty and tell me what it says. So I did. And we'd go through it sentence by sen-

tence, paragraph by paragraph, page by page and afterwards we'd say, "Well, we think that is what the treaty says. They want to do this, they want to do that," then he handed us the negotiating record and said, now read the negotiating record, not of one party but of all parties, and tell me what they want the treaty to

Saddam Hussein? We had a complicated relationship with Saddam Hussein and his government. In the late 1970s, early 1980s, Saddam Hussein was a state-sponsored terrorist, a man who gave safe haven to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, a man who was an ally of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War. But all that dramatically changed in 1979 when Iran and Iraq went to war. In the aftermath of the fall of the Shah of Iran, a close ally of the United States, the Ayatollah Khomeini takes over and the Iranians shift from being a close ally of the United States to being an enemy of the United States. Radical anti-American Islamic fundamentalism became the cause of the day and the Iranians were seeking to export it outside of their borders.

should cease being a combatant nation and become a good member, not only of the Middle East community, but the global community. We had a policy then called constructive engagement. We knew Iraq was doing things. We weren't happy with it, but we felt that the best way to deal with Iraq was to give them money and hope that they spent it wisely. Well, they didn't. They shifted that money and they procured technology that allowed them to expand the chemical weapons capability, the biological weapons capability, the long-range ballistic missile capability, their nuclear capability. And yet Bob Dole embraced Saddam Hussein and said, "You're a true friend of the American people." Now, all the American people saw was the image on TV—Bob Dole embracing Saddam, calling him a true friend of the American people.

Fast forward to October 1990—just a few months later. George Herbert Walker Bush is explaining to the American people why he's sending 700,000 of our troops off to engage in combat with Iraq. "Now wait a minute," they might say, "wasn't he just a true friend of the American people, and now we're going to war?" What is a president to do? Explain the complexities of the situation, the reality of what's going on with Iraq, explain the nuances to the American people? Since when has a politician trusted the constituency to be that open and honest with them? Never. The president couldn't be that honest with us.

There's an old saying a general taught me once. I was there explaining why I did something and he said, when you're explaining, you're losing. So now you have to have the president explaining to the American people how we go from true friend of the American people to war, for he can't get into the gray—he goes black and white—good versus evil. Saddam Hussein becomes the personification of evil.



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say. If you had five parties negotiating the treaty, you had five different points of view. You had compromised language that appeared in the treaty document, but that compromised language would be interpreted differently in five different locations.

Ladies and gentlemen, when you take a look at the mandate of disarmament set forth by the Security Council in its Resolution 687, don't read just the document. In order to understand what's really going on you must delve into the negotiating record. What was the intent? I will tell you this: the intent was not the disarmament of Iraq. What was the intent? Regime change. Why? Why would the United States want to get rid of

relations to somewhere where we had an embassy, we had military attaches, we were providing intelligence and economic assistance. Saddam Hussein, in short, became a true friend of the American people.

Now, that's not a term that I throw out there lightly. It's actually a term used by Senator Bob Dole when he visited Iraq in March of 1990 at the behest of George Herbert Walker Bush, the president of the United States. He was sent there to try to convince Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war that the Iraqis probably should ratchet down their weapons of mass destruction program, they should ratchet down their rhetoric against the state of Israel; that Iraq

So then the president, in an amazing moment of irresponsibility, says, “Saddam Hussein is the Middle East equivalent of Adolph Hitler and that requires Nuremberg-like retribution for his crime of invading and occupying Kuwait.” Now, once you link somebody, especially the president making the linkage, to someone like Adolph Hitler,

Adolph Hitler. And confront him we did. I fought in that war. We liberated Kuwait, we destroyed the Iraqi army, we destroyed the Iraqi economy, and we did our best to get rid of Saddam Hussein. I was on the cell that spent a good deal of time tracking Saddam, or attempting to, and dropping bombs on where we thought he was. We never got him.

United States did nothing while Saddam Hussein took the remainder of the Republican Guard that survived the war and crushed the Shia revolt, and crushed the Kurdish revolt.

You know, he called it regime change but in 1991 it wasn't regime change, it was name change. It was a policy of name change. You have to understand how critical that is. You see, regime change means you want to get rid of the regime, you want to change the nature of the forces of evil. But when you're talking about getting rid of Saddam Hussein and replacing him with a Sunni general who looks like Saddam, talks like Saddam, acts like Saddam and governs like Saddam but just isn't named Saddam that's not regime change—that's name change. Name change is not a policy, ladies and gentlemen, it's not a policy at all, but that's what we undertook—to contain Saddam.

Now, how do you contain Saddam? Through economic sanctions. Sanctions were imposed in August 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United Nations put these sanctions in place and hoped that we could compel Iraq to leave Kuwait voluntarily without resorting to the use of military force. That didn't work; we went to war, we liberated Kuwait. Now, any justification for the maintenance of economic sanctions have been removed, they must be lifted. But we can't lift them, the CIA said, because we need to contain Saddam so that he collapses from within. So we get a name change taking place. We can remove the political problem that George Herbert Walker Bush has created by calling Saddam Hussein Hitler. How do we do this? Enter weapons of mass destruction. Remember that negotiating record? Well, we draft a resolution and come in with a new excuse—the excuse was the weapons of mass destruction—a serious issue. But believe it or not it was not one that we viewed to be of global importance prior to the Gulf War. I can guarantee that because I was

The war ended. Kuwait was liberated, troops come home. Big parades in Washington, D.C., New York City, as we celebrate the amazing victory of the United States—except the American people were scratching their heads saying excuse me, you promised us Hitler's head on a platter, the boys are home, we're having victory parades when evil still resides in Baghdad. The president of the United States had a problem. Not a national security problem; we had solved that one, we destroyed the Iraqi military, we destroyed their economy. The president had a political problem, a domestic political problem. He called Saddam Hussein Hitler. He said that Hitler had to be given Nuremberg-like retribution. Now the war is over and Saddam Hussein still resides in Baghdad. What to do? We can't go to war again. We have all our troops home, there's no excuse, there's no trigger. This is an estimate [the CIA] put forward in March 1991—Saddam Hussein can't survive more than six months. All we have to do is contain Saddam for six months because his military is destroyed, he's embarrassed, his economy is in ruins. Someone will apply the seventy-five cent solution—the cost of a nine-millimeter bullet, placed squarely in the back of Saddam Hussein's head—and we won't have to worry about Saddam any more. Somebody will step in and take over. Somebody, by the way, who's not a Shia and who's not a Kurd, but a Sunni Baathist. You see, the Shia had tried to rise up. The president said he wanted to see the Iraqi people take matters into their own hands and the Shia rose up in the south, the Kurds rose up in the north, and the

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you've eliminated any diplomatic settlement. You can't do business with Hitler, you can't negotiate with Hitler, you can't deal with the devil. At that point in time the president was trapped by his own rhetoric into ensuring that Saddam Hussein did not survive the upcoming war.

Now, it's a war that the international community said was about the liberation of Kuwait, but the president, in dealing with the American people, understood that the American people weren't too keen on our boys dying in Kuwait over oil. If you recall, back in 1990-91 there was significant unrest in the United States. “No blood for oil,” read the signs. So, the president was not going to make an argument saying we have to invade and liberate Kuwait to preserve Kuwaiti democracy, to ensure our oil supply. No. It had to become a Biblical conflict between good and evil. We had to confront the Middle East equivalent of

an intelligence officer making these assessments. We didn't view Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction as something worthy of war. We didn't view Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction as something that threatened international peace and security. It was a regional nuisance. It was something that Israel and Iran should worry about, but not the United States. Now, in 1991 with his army destroyed, his economy in ruins, his weapons of mass destruction become a global threat? Well, that's what we told the Security Council and we drafted a resolution and we sold it. We said, these weapons cannot be left in Iraq with Saddam Hussein in power. We have to get rid of the weapons. In order to compel Iraq to cooperate we will link the disarmament of Iraq with economic sanctions.

Now with the new justification—sanctions will be maintained until Iraq is found to be in compliance with its obligation to disarm. How many in Congress took a look at the resolution after it passed? Because there's a little paragraph that says if Iraq complies, sanctions will be lifted. Excuse me, Mr. President, you've just given Adolph Hitler an out. Basically, if Iraq complies with its obligation to disarm, sanctions will be lifted, containment broken, Saddam comes back into a fully international community at the head of Iraq. Hitler wins. You can't do that, Mr. President. James Baker was sent to testify before the United States congress in May 1991—one month after we passed this resolution. James Baker said that even if Iraq complied with its obligation to disarm, economic sanctions will remain in place until the time Saddam Hussein is removed from power. The policy, ladies and gentlemen, was not disarmament. The policy was regime change. Disarmament was only useful insofar as it facilitated regime change.

The other thing that's important to note about this policy is that it is not

driven by the legitimate national security interests of the United States of America. It's driven by the domestic political imperative created by the president's own rhetoric. We had a foreign policy that focuses on regime change so that the president can avoid embarrassment. You see it wasn't about disarmament. I can tell you, I was a weapons inspector, I was in Iraq, we were trying to disarm. We knew about America's unilateral policy objectives. Even if we didn't, the Iraqis would have told us.

Tarik Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister, on December 1991, shouted down Rolf Ekeus the Swedish Ambassador heading the inspections program. "Why should we cooperate with you?" he said. "Even if we do everything you've asked us to do, which we view as a huge infringement on our sovereignty because it's a unilateral decision to get rid of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction—what about Iranian weapons of mass destruction? What about Syrian weapons of mass destruction? What about Israeli weapons of mass destruction?—No, you're coming after us. Okay what if we do everything, then what? The United States in the Security Council, with a Security Council veto, says they'll never lift sanctions. Who's running this boat? The United Nations or the United States?" Now, how do you answer that question if you're the executive chairman? All you can do is say, we'll move forward with our mandate to disarm and let the Security Council sort out this political problem, which we did.

At that time I was responsible for ballistic missiles. We knew right up front that the Iraqis weren't telling the truth. I wrote an assessment in November 1991 that said that I believed the Iraqis had under-declared the number of missiles by at least 100—that there were at least 100 missiles out there and there had to be half a dozen mobile launchers. Well, in March 1992 the Iraqis, under pressure from the U.N. weapons inspectors, came

in with a new declaration. They declared that they lied about their weapons of mass destruction programs and in the field of ballistic missiles they had six launchers and 98 missiles. I was off by two but I thought that was pretty good. A lot of people today, when they talk about Iraq, say it was an intelligence failure and they say that intelligence is a tough business and sometimes you get it wrong. Well, I have to say we don't get it that wrong and I just proved it. At the core of every sound intelligence analysis is a hard kernel of truth. You might get it wrong on the peripheral, but you never get it fundamentally wrong, such as there's weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, oops, there's not. But I can tell you that in 1991 there were, and the Iraqis lied about it.

In 1992 we were confronted with the fact that there's 98 missiles out there, unaccounted for. We have to go get them, So I take a team into Iraq. We expected the Iraqis to declare the missiles and take us to a field where there would be 98 missiles lined up and we're going to account for them. We get off the bus and there's

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a field but no missiles. We turn to the Iraqis and say, what's going on here? Where are the missiles? They said, we blew them up in the summer of 1991 and buried them in the ground. So, the weapons inspectors became forensic archeologists. We had to bring the bulldozers, dig up the bits and pieces and start cataloging them. Every component in a

missile has a unique serial number. They blew them up and put them in the ground. We pull them out again, we record the serial number, page after page after page. Then we go to the Soviet Union—by that time it's Russia, we go to the factory that produced these missiles and we compared our findings with the production logs and we matched each serial number to a given component, each component to a given missile, each missile to a given shipping record, each shipping record to the missile delivered in Iraq. Ninety-six out of 98 were confirmed, verified as being in the ground. That's good work, ladies and gentlemen. That's outstanding work. Ninety-six out of 98.

But there are two missiles unaccounted for. We got bits and pieces we think might be the missing two, but because Iraq had lied to us, because they deceived us, we couldn't accept what they said at face value and had to raise the bar. We needed proof, we needed evidence and the Iraqis just couldn't provide it. So we had to continue investigating, and we did. I led teams throughout the summer of 1992 and into the fall of 1992 searching for documents, investigating factories, going to operational facilities, and debriefing the commanding general of their ballistic missile force. All of the engineers involved in the inspection came out in October 1992 and said Eureka!, we can account for our missiles and arms program. There are no more ballistic missiles in Iraq.

Now our job is to disarm, so this is a time for great celebration. I go down to Washington, D.C. where I brief 60 of the top intelligence analysts about our findings and I tell them—remember disarmament, mission success, no one thought we could do it—and I tell them we did it. We accomplished the impossible. One would expect a top gun moment, hats in the air. No, icy silence. They didn't want to hear that. They didn't want to hear it to the extent that a week later they provided me with a four page document that


rejected all the findings of the weapons inspectors; furthermore, the Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, goes before the United States Senate and tells them that the CIA's estimate is that there's two hundred missiles left in Iraq. It's mathematically impossible, but it's irrelevant. Because he said it, it became so.

Now the inspectors have to go out and search for two hundred missiles that don't exist. We have to prove a negative, so to speak. We ask the intelligence security, where do you get your information? What data do you have? First, they didn't want to tell us. "It's too secret," they said. You don't have a need to know. We said, we're the inspectors, we have a need to know, you have to give it to us. So, they told us Iraq was hiding them on trucks, putting them on the trucks and then shuttling the trucks around.

Now, Iraq is a nation the size of the state of California. Imagine trying to interdict all the trucks in California and find there's ballistic missiles hidden in the back of them. How do you begin doing that? We tried. We looked at photographs, we looked at truck depots and we stopped convoys and we looked in the back, lifted them open and there's nothing. What does that mean? That there's no missiles in Iraq or that we just got the wrong trucks? You see, it's a never-ending exercise. We'll always be looking for the trucks.

I said, this isn't good enough, guys. There's got to be more than just two hundred missiles on the back of trucks. They said there was. We've got missiles buried in the ground. We've got missiles dug into the side of mountains, we've got missiles put in the bottom of rivers, at the bottom of lakes. It was fascinat-

ing. "Do you have the specific locations?" "Yes, but it's very secret. You have to keep it very close." I said, "don't worry I can keep a secret just give me the data." I called their bluff. If it's under-



ground I need a ground penetrating radar. So we designed and built it—\$12 million of U.S. taxpayer money. We built this thing, we tested it in California at Edwards Air Force Base, we took it to Iraq. We spent two months going to every single site the CIA gave us. I bring in dive teams who went into rivers and lakes with high-technology equipment looking for the buried material. We went out into the mountains and looked into the mountains. Every site the CIA gave us turned out to be an empty hole. In fact, there was no hole there at all. There was nothing. No holes, no missiles, nothing.

We came back, went to Washington, D.C. in November 1993 and met with the Director of the CIA and the senior staff

and gave them the bad news. That all their intelligence had been debunked, that we are standing by our assessment. That there are no ballistic missiles in Iraq. I was thanked and invited to leave. The Director of the CIA, James Woolsey said Ritter did an okay job. Commend the young man. We agree, there aren't 200

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missiles in Iraq. There's 12 to 20 and that number will never change, regardless of what you do. Now catch what I just said—that number will never change, regardless of what you do. Ladies and gentlemen, the United States had no intention of allowing the weapons inspectors to succeed in their work, because if we succeed you must acknowledge that success, and if you acknowledge that success you must lift the economic embargo breaking the containment. No, the job was the removal of Saddam Hussein.

In October 1992 I gave the first briefing, at the same time the president was signing what's called a lethal finding—a Presidential National Security Directive tasking the CIA to use whatever means necessary, up to and including the use of lethal force, to remove Saddam Hussein from power. That's the CIA's job. Their job is not to disarm Iraq; the job is to get rid of the dictator. Weapons inspections and disarmament are only useful insofar as they facilitate regime change. That means that so long as the inspectors are finding that Iraq is not

cooperating, we're the good guys. But when we start disarming Iraq, when we start succeeding, we become a threat to the national security of the United States of America that must be confronted and undermined.

We inspectors spent a lot of time in Iraq and we were confronted by the Iraqis. It wasn't an easy job. A lot of people were aware of that. There's plenty of television clips showing inspectors in the face of Iraqis saying, we have to be let in here, we have to be let in there. But what you don't see is the fight that took place behind the scenes, the fight of the United States government over the legitimacy and integrity of the inspection operation. That's a fight the American people didn't witness. That's the fight they should have witnessed because if they had done so they would have recognized that what we're doing with Iraq isn't about the national security but about domestic American politics, a threat that our elected representative, the president, felt from the continued existence of Saddam Hussein. As I said, not regime change but name change.

Now, Bill Clinton becomes president and he inherits this policy. He's not comfortable with this, not comfortable at all. He says, I don't believe in this regime change nonsense, I think I'm a good Southern Baptist, I can do business with Saddam, I think we should negotiate and seek to lift the sanctions. Immediately the Republicans and Democrats alike come to him and say, you can't do that. We've told our constituents that Saddam is the devil. Now if you start negotiating and lifting sanctions, we have to go back and explain why America suddenly changed course on Iraq. Can't do it Mr. President, stick with the action. He wasn't a big believer, but he stuck with it, he sustained the policy, he sustained the lethal finding.

The CIA created something called the Iraqi National Congress, and brings in a nice little head of the organization called Ahmed Chalabi, a name everybody here should be familiar with. Just keep in mind that before he became the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq he was a paid CIA agent, whose sole responsibility was to maintain the fiction of a viable opposition. He wasn't a real opposition, he was just allowing the CIA to tell the president that we're doing something over here about getting rid of Saddam Hussein.

But we weren't doing enough, especially for the Republicans. In 1994 Newt Gingrich leads the new revolution where the Republicans come sweeping in, and one of the first things Newt Gingrich does is say, "this president doesn't do good things for the security of the United States—Saddam Hussein continues to reign in Baghdad." Newt Gingrich used Bill Clinton's unwillingness, or inability to deal with Saddam Hussein as domestic political fuel to feed that fire that becomes so hot that in 1995 Bill Clinton says, "I have a new election coming up in 1996 and we didn't do too good in 1994; this Saddam thing is a problem." He tells the CIA to ratchet up the pressure, "gentlemen, get rid of Saddam Hussein, I want him gone by the summer of 1996." That's a directive given by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger to the Director of the CIA: get Saddam out by the summer of 1996, and the CIA goes to work.

But the first thing it ran into was a problem. Saddam is protected by concentric circles of security that can't be penetrated—unless you're U.N. weapons inspectors; then you can go anywhere, anytime in Iraq. So, the CIA uses the U.N. weapons inspection process as a Trojan horse that allows them to get into Iraq, not to assist in disarmament but to gather intelligence about the security of Saddam Hussein.

In June 1996 there was a coup that was launched. Remember that Ahmed Chalabi guy? He was dumped by the CIA because he wasn't very good. They brought in a new group—the Iraqi National Accord, led by another name that should be familiar, Ayad Allawi. But before he had the grand career in Iraqi politics he was a paid agent of the CIA who was facilitating a coup d'état attempt against Saddam Hussein. Well, it failed. Magnificently if you're Saddam Hussein, but horrifically if you're Ayad Allawi and the plotters. You see, Iraqi intelligence had penetrated the coup plot in the very beginning. The triggering moment, was a U.N. weapons inspection, that I was leading, that was supposed to facilitate a confrontation that would lead to an American military action that would decapitate Saddam Hussein's security forces, freeing the plotters to come in and remove Saddam Hussein. On the eve of that, the Iraqis moved and arrested everybody and the coup plot failed. But in its failure the Iraqis found out one thing. The complicity between the CIA and the United Nations weapons inspection process—not the inspectors, but the process—and from that moment on the Iraqis, whenever they saw a U.N. weapons inspector, didn't see someone who was trying to disarm their country, they saw somebody trying to assassinate their president, and sadly they were right.

Reflect on what the CIA says today. The CIA acknowledges that all weapons of mass destruction were destroyed by the Iraqis in the summer of 1991. Ask yourself, therefore, why would Iraq obstruct the work of weapons inspectors in 1996 and 1998, a period of high intensity where there was this clash between inspectors and the Iraqi government? Why would the Iraqis do this if they're not hiding weapons of mass destruction? People say, well, Saddam was bluffing. He was trying to create the impression he had weapons. How do you bluff when you acknowledge right up front you don't have any weapons? He said we

don't have any weapons. You can come in and do anything you want except threaten me.

You see, a lot of people don't realize that when we were doing tactical base inspections from the factories that could be used for arms we had total cooperation from the Iraqi government. It's only when we went to the presidential palaces or security institutions that the Iraqis stood up and obstructed us. Now I and others viewed the Iraqi obstruction as evidence they might be hiding something, but in fact all they were hiding was information pertaining to the security of their own president because the United States was trying to assassinate Saddam Hussein.

Bill Clinton didn't deal with Saddam Hussein in 1996 and allowed the Republicans another venue for criticizing Bill Clinton, one that led to the passage in the Congress of the United States, in bi-partisan fashion, of the Iraq Liberation Act in the fall of 1998. It sent \$100 million of U.S. taxpayers' money to fund the work of Ahmed Chalabi and the opposition groups to get rid of Saddam Hussein. It's public law. But Clinton is not a big fan; the CIA says Chalabi is useless and it's a waste of money, so he didn't fully fund the opposition, which opened the door for the Republican Party in 2000 to say Bill Clinton, and his Vice President Al Gore, don't care about the security of the United States—I, George W. Bush, do. A corner of our foreign policy platform, therefore, is full implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act. We will empower Ahmed Chalabi to get rid of Saddam Hussein, getting rid of Saddam Hussein is now our policy objective.

But it's gone far beyond name change, because now Republicans are touting regime change—going in and getting rid of the Baathist Party. You can't do that with a coup d'état, you can only do that with a full invasion of Iraq.

Now, that was a difficult thing to sell to the American public prior to 9/11. After 9/11 we, the people of the United States of America, ignorant of what goes on in the world around us, fearful of what goes on because of our ignorance, allowed ourselves to be exploited by the president, who exploited this fear by saying that Saddam Hussein was linked with the perpetrators of the 9/11 events. He said it's not so much about the weapons that Saddam has or even Osama bin Ladin, it's the fact that Saddam Hussein will transfer this technology to Osama bin Ladin, who showed a penchant for attacking the United States. The next attack could make the events of 9/11 pale in comparison. And so the American people went, "Oh

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my goodness, what are you going to do about that?" And sure enough they had a plan—invade Iraq. Not a coup d'état, not supporting opposition groups, but the invasion of Iraq. They took it to the United States Congress.

Now, remember a lot of people said the Congress had a heck of a debate going on in 2002. I submit that Congress had no debate going on in 2002. One only needs to take a look at the work of California's own Senator Dianne Feinstein, who sat on the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, to know that Congress abrogated its constitutional responsibilities when it came to (a) over-

sight and (b) to the issues pertaining to war. I met with Dianne Feinstein in August 2002 and I asked her, straight to her face, have you seen any intelligence information? You don't have to tell me what it is, I don't have a need to know, but have you seen anything to sustain the statements made by the Bush administration about the existence of weapons of mass destruction? She said, "I have seen nothing." And yet she voted for war. Why? Because she was too scared to stand up against the Bush machine after 9/11, too afraid to be called unpatriotic. Well, how unpatriotic is it for an American politician to safeguard her own political career at the expense of the lives of thousands of American soldiers? It's not very courageous in my book.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Republicans today are saying that we went to war on a mistake, that we got it wrong but it's a good thing we went to war that we got rid of Saddam. I would submit to you that, as Americans, we can't accept that. We're a nation that believes in the rule of law, a constitution that sets forth the notion of due process. The ends justifying the means is something that's as un-American as anything out there. We are about the means justifying the ends. If you accept the notion of the ends justifying the means you're saying the constitution no longer applies, the rule of law no longer applies. Because it's not just about Saddam Hussein, it's about everybody, because once you allow an exception to due process it's a slippery slope downwards.

So I reject the notion that the Bush administration puts out that the ends justifies the means. I also reject the notion

that it was a mistake. I tried to highlight here tonight that there was no mistake. The policy wasn't disarming. The CIA

It's really convenient today to be against the war if you're a Democrat because President Bush's figures are rock bottom and sinking fast. What happens if the president's poll numbers reverse and start turning upwards?

knew in 1992 that there were no ballistic missiles in Iraq. They knew in 1993 that there was no nuclear weapons program in Iraq. They knew in 1994 there was no more chemical weapons program in Iraq and they knew in 1995 that there was no biological weapons program in Iraq. They knew this. We couldn't account for everything, but fundamentally everything was accounted for. The programs were done, we were monitoring the factories. But disarmament wasn't the policy, regime change was, and the Democrats knew it. The Democrats voted for the Iraq Liberation Act. The Democrats were afraid to stand up and be against this war because they'd be accused of being *for* Saddam, and today the Democrats are rewriting history saying that somehow we were deceived. Ladies and gentlemen, they weren't deceived. The Democrats went into this war with their eyes wide shut. They knew this was a lie, they knew this was hyped, and none of them had the courage, no major Democratic figure had the courage, to stand

up to this war and we see that reflected in the activities that are taking place today.

Representative Murtha in Pennsylvania and others now suddenly have new courage to speak out against this war. How can we be against this war if you voted for this war? He says too many Americans have died. Oh, excuse me Mr. Murtha—Col. Murtha, a former Marine—you know darn well that when there's a cause Americans are willing to sacrifice. We put 5,000 Marines across the beach at Iwo Jima, we sacrificed a thousand more in Okinawa for a cause worthy of the sacrifice. If Iraq is such a cause 2,100, is a small price to pay, 21,000 is a small price to pay, 210,000 is the price we must be willing to pay if it's a cause worthy of the sacrifice of a single American life.

Why is Murtha suddenly against this war? Some newfound morality? No, the presidential poll numbers are down. It's really convenient today to be against the war if you're a Democrat because President Bush's figures are rock bottom and sinking fast. What happens if the president's poll numbers reverse and start turning upwards? Where would people be in their opposition to this war? You can't be against this war unless you're against the entire war—against the notion that we should have gone to war to get rid of Saddam Hussein. It's not just about dead Americans, it's about why the Americans died, and they died in a cause that sadly is not worth the life of a single American.

Thank you very much.

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