Speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on November 6, 2000:

Ambassador Dennis Ross

Special Middle East Coordinator, U.S. Department of State

Thanks, Eli [Broad].  I don’t know what’s tougher—making Middle East peace or getting a pro football team to L.A.  Until recently I probably would have said getting a pro football team to L.A.  I may change that now.

Over the years I’ve given a lot of speeches on peacemaking in the Middle East, and there have been times when I’ve come and had to give speeches that were extraordinarily difficult.  When I gave speeches after Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated I can tell you I’ve never had to face a more difficult time to give a speech.  When I had to give speeches after four bombs and nine days in 1996 I also found it very difficult to give those speeches.  Well, I come to you again at a time when it is difficult to give a speech about peacemaking in the Middle East.  What makes it especially difficult is not just the circumstances on the ground.  They would make it hard in any case.  What makes it especially difficult is that in the last several months, and especially prior to the time this particular crisis on the ground erupted, we were for the first time in the history of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians dealing with the most existential questions between them, issues like Jerusalem and borders and settlements and refugees and security arrangements. We were dealing with them in a very serious fashion.  So I faced what is almost a kind of paradox that, on the one hand, we are now looking at events on the ground that are extremely troubling to see--and I would even say disheartening for people like me who have worked in this for so long--and yet I also know where we were in terms of trying to reconcile the differences between the two sides.

It is, in fact, a paradox that the three days of September 26, 27 and 28, I was meeting with the negotiators on each side, going back and forward between them to see if there was a bridge that could be built to overcome the differences that existed. And at the end of three days of negotiations at that time--and again this is five weeks ago--all three of us felt that, in fact, we could see the way to an agreement, as difficult as it was, as hard as it was still going to be, as uncertain as it still might be--there was a sense among all three of us that this is something that could be done.  That was five weeks ago and for me it feels like it’s a different world in five weeks.  So when I speak to you tonight I want to say a few things:  I want to talk about how the Israelis and the Palestinians perceive and explain what has happened the last five weeks. I want to talk about the effect it has on peacemaking, and I want to talk about what, if any, choice there is in terms of pursuing peace.

Let me start with how the two sides explain and see what has happened in the last five weeks.  Needless to say, what I’m going to describe represents views that are 180 degrees apart.  When the Israelis look at what has happened in the last five weeks they see it as something that has been contrived.  They see violence having been used as a device to try to affect the negotiations.  They see violence being used as a device to try to change the balance of public opinion internationally.  They see violence being used as a device to create either a more favorable outcome from the standpoint of the Palestinians or an international intervention that will produce that.  The Israelis believe that this is all taking place in a context where they have an Israeli government that has been more forthcoming, in Israeli eyes, than any Israeli government ever before.  They wonder why this takes place, and they draw the conclusion that the Palestinians at this point either are not interested in peace or they have grave doubts about whether the Palestinians are prepared to live in peace. They look at these five weeks and they see commitments that have been made but not fulfilled, they see Israelis demonstrating, from time to time, restraint as in the case of the withdrawal from Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus and they see a response that betrays the value of any restraint when they exhibit it.  So the conclusion they draw is that they are now dealing in a circumstance where they have many more doubts about whether or not peace is possible with their Palestinian partners.

Well, I can assure you the Palestinians see it very differently.   From the Palestinian perspective, the world looks 180 degrees different, as I’ve said.  The Palestinians look at the Israelis and they say, the Israelis deal with us in an insensitive way and in an indifferent way.  They see the Sharon visit as somehow being allowed by the Israeli government, they see it as something that was designed to transform a political conflict into a religious conflict, they say that this was a visit whose purpose was to ignite great passions--and it did--and they see the Israeli response in the aftermath of that and the riots that took place, they see the Israeli response as one that is characterized by a use of excessive force.  Palestinians look at Israelis and say “you use excessive force because you look at us somehow as subhuman.”  The level of Palestinian frustration and anger is deep; you don’t turn on and off the kind of feelings that we have seen.  That is a function of looking at a process that Eli was talking about that has lasted seven years, and the promise of that process, in their eyes, hasn’t been met.  They still see Israeli control, they still see Israeli check points, they still see Israeli settlement-building.  The conclusion they see at this point, the explanation they make for their public, is that the Israelis are pursuing a process that is designed to maintain control but not give the Palestinians their independence.

Now, when you look at it the way I just described it, I’m not describing it in terms of our views, or your views.  I’m simply saying “What do I hear?  What do we hear from the Israelis?  What do we hear from the Palestinians?”  And what we hear suggests that peacemaking is going to be very difficult now.  What we hear indicates that the last five weeks have created a deep resentment, a sense of betrayal, mistrust and there are very deep physic wounds that are going to take some time to repair and to recover from.  Notwithstanding that I can tell you that last week we had the acting foreign minister of Israel, Shlomo Ben-Ami, come to Washington and after he came we had Saab Erekat, the chief negotiator on the Palestinian side, come to Washington.  They met with the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, and I spent a lot of time with each of them.  I can tell you each of them said there’s no choice but to pursue peace. 

What we see now cannot be the future.  What we see now is the tip of the iceberg of what things could become and it’s not acceptable.  Moderates, they say, have to be more determined to press ahead, not less so.  So there may be frustration, there may be anger, there may be mistrust, there may be great doubt, and yet they say, “Continue to work at it.  Continue to proceed.”  And even though there’s this frustration and there’s this anger and there’s this mistrust, the contacts between the two sides continue.  Last week Simon Peres and Chairman Arafat got together and they forged a set of understandings designed to restore some level of tranquility and recreate a basis for reconciliation so that peace could again be pursued.  There’s obviously a lot of work to be done to reestablish that environment of tranquility.  There’s a lot of work that needs to be done to create a bridge from a psychology of confrontation and rage to a psychology of peacemaking.  And yet as I’ve said they see the need to continue to do it. 

Now why do they cling to that?  Why is it so essential for them not to give up the effort and give up the hope?  This is a rhetorical question, because I have the answer.  There is a fundamental reality that has not been changed by the last five weeks.  That fundamental reality is that Israelis and Palestinians live next to each other.  They are neighbors.  It is an immutable reality.  It cannot be changed.  You cannot wish one side or the other to go away, because they won’t.  History and geography have destined them to be neighbors and they’re going to remain as neighbors.  So they have a choice.  The choice is to live in perpetual struggle with perpetual pain, with perpetual victims, with shattered lives and shattered families and shattered dreams--or to live in peaceful coexistence.  At Oslo, and Eli gave a little bit of the history, at least when it was launched in September 13, at Oslo a choice was made for peaceful coexistence. 

Now one thing is very clear.  Translating that choice into reality has proven very difficult and it has taken much longer than they thought.  They envisioned a five-year timetable, and we’re in the seventh year.  They have created through the Oslo process a series of different agreements based on a bargain.  The fundamental bargain of Oslo was recognition for Israel and security and the fundamental bargain for the Palestinians was recognition and a pathway to achieve their aspirations of independence. 

They have negotiated five partial peace agreements on the way to what their objective is.  The first agreement was in May 1994, although it was supposed to have been achieved by December of 1993.  That created the Gaza-Jericho authority.  The Palestinians established the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and Jericho at that time.  The second agreement was the interim agreement at the end of September 1995.  That extended the Palestinian authority to the key cities in the West Bank with the exception of Hebron.  It also created, as you said, a process that was supposed to produce an evolution of Israeli authority to Palestinian authority, a gradual handover through three phases of further redeployment of territory that was to be worked out over time.  The Rabin assassination came, the four bombs in nine days came, Benjamin Netanyahu was elected as Prime Minister, and there was another agreement that didn’t come until January of 1997, the Hebron agreement which brought the Palestinians authority over 80 percent of Hebron and which did work out a timetable, or a timeline, on further redeployments.  The Hebron part of that agreement was implemented.  The balance of further redeployments was something that didn’t get resolved until the Wye agreement in 1998.  That was supposed to produce, again, a balance of further redeployment for security.  That wasn’t fully implemented until the Sharm [al-Shaikh] agreement, which came with Ehud Barak and Chairman Arafat.  But that agreement not only produced the first two phases of further redeployment, it also produced a commitment to achieve a framework agreement on all the permanent status issues by February and a complete agreement on all of the permanent status issues by September of this year.  You may note we’re in November of this year. 

It has been very difficult to negotiate these agreements and this year we got in for the first time, to dealing with the existential question, which go to the heart of identity and security for the two sides.  In the course of this year, the ability to negotiate on that was clearly limited.  We watched the negotiations, took part in the negotiations, prodded the negotiators, did everything we could through the spring and into the summer.  One of the things that we discovered is that on the issues, the core issues that were being negotiated, like Jerusalem, like settlements, like borders, like refugees, on those core issues it was very hard below the level of the leaders to negotiate at a level other than slogans.  Now, slogans are fine.  Slogans defend positions.  They encapsulate beliefs.  But you don’t make peace on the basis of slogans.  You don’t make peace through a reconciliation of slogans.  You make peace by negotiating differences.  You make peace by reconciling different interests.

During the course of this year we faced two realities.  One reality was we had to find a way to overcome their approach to the permanent status issues so that they didn’t negotiate on the basis of slogans.  We also realized that there was a level of frustration on both sides about a process that was in its seventh year.  For the Israelis, the sense that you would have another partial agreement was completely unacceptable.  Why?  Because they felt that the partial agreements constituted the equivalent of slicing up a salami.  They would give more land, but what would they get in return?  Would they get an end of grievance, would they get an end of claims, would they get an end of conflict?  Not if it was a partial agreement. But the Palestinians were just as much against the ideal of a partial agreement, because they were in the seventh year of the process, and each partial agreement never seemed to be fully implemented.  The promise of the process never seemed to be realized, the nature of Israeli control didn’t seem to change, and from a Palestinian perspective, they wanted an agreement that would in fact produce what this process was supposed to produce in terms of responding to their aspirations. 

Both from the standpoint of being able to negotiate beyond the level of generalities and slogans and from the standpoint of realizing that another partial agreement was not going to be accepted by either side, we realized that we would have to do something.  That’s basically what led to Camp David.  At Camp David we did change the dynamic, we did break the stalemate and we did break the taboo on dealing with the hardest of the hard issues.  For the first time in this process both sides dissected these issues, examined these issues.  They laid out to each other what was possible and wasn’t possible.  They laid out to each other what they saw as being essential.  They gave their explanations in a way they had never done before and progress was made on every single issue, but no deal was reached.  In the aftermath of Camp David we continued to make the effort that led up to what I described before, the work at the end of September.  Now we still had gaps.  We had not overcome the gaps, but there was a sense of possibility.  More than that, there was an understanding that the core needs of each side were clearer to each other, and certainly to us, than they had ever been before and ultimately the key is, can you reconcile the core needs, not what’s desired, but what’s fundamental. 

Now if you ask me the question “Can you do that in the abstract?”  My answer is “Yes.”  If you ask me the question “Can you do it in the aftermath of five weeks, the past five weeks, of violence and a cycle of violence and a cycle of grievance that has gotten worse?” my answer is “I don’t know.”  But I can tell you this:  There are certain basic truths that have to guide this process if it is going to succeed.  The first truth is that this is going to have to be a peace not only of negotiators and leaders.  It’s going to have to be a peace of peoples and publics.  One of the things we’ve seen in the last five weeks is what happens when the only people who are engaged in the process are the elite and when you don’t engage the publics.  One of the problems with Oslo, even though it was recognized, was that there has not been a people-to-people dimension that has been significant.  Somehow, someway that has to change.  This, by the way, is not a new theme. In fact, I think when I spoke [to the Council] in June of 1999 I talked about the importance of people-to-people. 

We have not been able to translate that into a new reality.  If what we’re seeing now doesn’t impress upon us the need to do it, nothing will.  There has to be something that is done differently in terms of breaking down the barriers between people, there has to be something that is done differently that changes the stereotypes that exist within the publics on each side, and in the near term there’s going to have to be something else.  I described a sense of grievances that each side feels, that each side perceives, that each side describes to us, but they shouldn’t be describing those grievances to us.  They should be describing those grievances to each other.  There should be discussion groups now that deal with all walks of life between Israelis and Palestinians so that they can talk with each other and not just at each other.  So they can explain why they feel the anger they feel, why they feel the sense of betrayal they feel.  It is not enough to tell others.  They’re going to have to tell each other, and that’s one of the first truths.  There’s going to have to be a peace of peoples and not just of leaders.

A second truth about this process:  There is no solution that can be imposed from without or from within.  We cannot impose a solution.  It will not endure.  Nobody has a stake in a solution that is imposed from the outside.  The first opportunity to break it, it will be broken.  So there is no such thing as the imposition of a solution.  But it’s also true for the parties: it can’t be imposed from within.  The Israelis cannot impose a settlement on the Palestinians.  There is no military solution to this problem.  There’s only a political solution.  But the Palestinians cannot impose a solution on the Israelis.  The intifada will not achieve Palestinian aspirations.  It will delay the achievement of those aspirations. 

There’s a third truth, which is related to the second one.  There’s no unilateral way to resolve this conflict.  A unilateral declaration of statehood is not going to resolve this conflict.  Where would the borders of such a state be?  Where would the powers of sovereignty be?  You’ll have constant tests and you’ll have constant confrontation.  It is equally true that there is no unilateral separation that can produce an agreement because again you’ll have points of friction that would become constant tests between the two sides. There has to be a mutuality.  Unilateralism will not resolve this conflict, but a mutual approach that in the end responds to the needs of both sides can and ultimately will because there is not an alternative and because they know there is not an alternative.

 I can tell you that the basic outline of what was being developed by us at Camp David in the aftermath does respond to the needs of both sides.  What I can’t tell you is whether we can have an agreement on that basis in one month or two months, in one year or two years, or in five years.  What I can tell you is that the basic outcome will be the same.  The only difference will be that we’ll have a lot more victims. 

For someone like me it’s unconscionable not to continue to make the effort when you know that that’s one of the truths that we deal with.  We will continue to make the effort because it’s the right thing to do.  We will continue to make the effort but we’ll make the effort not with an air of unreality and not with an illusion.  In the end, if one side or the other isn’t ready, it doesn’t matter what we do.  It matters what they do.  It matters what they decide.  So we will keep up the effort, we’ll see what is possible, but in the end this is a peace that Israelis and Palestinians must make.  If they’re ready it will happen.  If they’re not ready, it won’t.  I’ll stop here and take your questions.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q    What do you think of Arafat‘s comments about bringing Russia into the negotiations?

A    There’s been a perception out there that also doesn’t fit with reality.  The perception is that somehow the United States determines who’s involved in negotiations.  We don’t.  There’s a very simple proposition here.  It’s the parties who determine who’s going to be helping them in the negotiations.  If the United States wanted to exclude others from participating but the two parties didn’t, we would have no impact.  If we wanted others to be in and the two parties didn’t, we would have no impact.  We don’t object to others taking part in helping out.  The fact of the matter is that anybody who can contribute to leading to a solution is something that is positive.  Something that’s going to be welcomed by us. At the end of the day, though, it’s not something that’s determined by us.  It’s determined by the two sides.  It’s not an accident that they have turned to the United States.

Q    Can you describe the economic disparity between Palestinians and Jews in Israel and how has that contributed over the years [to the conflict]? 

A    I would characterize it in terms of disparity between Palestinians and Israelis.  Israel is a modern society.  It has a $100 billion GNP.  In the West Bank and Gaza, the GNP is probably 3 to 4 billion.  The per capita income in Israel is probably $17,000 a year; in the West Bank and Gaza it’s probably less than $1,000 a year.  The fact is, if you want to make peace you don’t have to be equal in terms of wealth but you certainly have a stake in terms of building the material underpinnings for making peace.  The fact that life is difficult among Palestinians is not something that has made this process any easier.  We have tried to work since 1993 to generate assistance from the outside.  One of the things that’s needed is not only assistance from the outside but a lot of investment as well.  I think if you want to give people a stake in peace, it’s also very important to uplift the quality of life, especially from a material standpoint and the more that can be done in that regard the better it will be.

Q    How would you respond to the use of children in the conflict in Israel?

A    Well, I would say it’s a tragedy.  A third of casualties, a third of those who have died are under the age of 18.  I don’t think that anybody can look at a situation like that and not view it as a tragedy.  From the standpoint of the State Department, I think we’re focused much more on how you stop the killing, how you stop the violence, how you stop the cycle of recrimination, how you stop the cycle of grievance.  It’s real easy to sort of point the finger at one side or the other.  The question is how does that contribute to trying to transform the situation and end the killing and end the cycle of violence?  I think what matters here is that we find a way to have each side do what they can which we outlined a series of commitments which they accepted. First in Paris then in Sharm (al Sheikh),  then in the Simon Peres-Arafat understanding that would have both sides act in a way to try to break that cycle.  The fact is that if both sides do, that cycle will be broken and then you won’t see those kinds of deaths.

Q.    What has been the role and what have been the discussions with the oil-producing nations in the area and the Arab League?

A    Well, we’ve had discussions with everybody in the area.  This is an issue that obviously concerns everybody because it has had an effect beyond that involving only the Israelis and the Palestinians.  I think it’s pretty clear that they would like the situation brought under control and we are hearing from them that they would like to see the political process rekindled and reestablished.  At the end of the day, as I’ve said, what others do may be less important than what the parties themselves are prepared to do.

Q    What’s your crystal ball—what’s going to happen with Dennis after the election?

A    Well, that is actually something I do control.  I have done this for a long time and while my own commitment to working on it hasn’t flagged I think the impact that it’s had on my family is something I have to take account of.  So, I intend to work through the end of this administration, but I don’t intend to stay for the next one.

Q    Would you please expand on your remarks on stereotyping and who the remark was aimed toward?

A    I don’t think stereotyping works anyplace but my focus was between Israelis and Palestinians and Israelis in the Arab world more generally.   There are some limited people-to-people programs that have been quite remarkable in terms of their effect when you talk to those involved.  Somehow we have to expand the scope.  I’ve met many times with the kids from the Seeds of Peace and I see what three weeks together does to them in terms of their attitudes, what they come in with and what they leave with, how they see each other, how they transform their impressions of each other.  I’ve watched them go from looking at the others, from Israelis or Palestinians or kids from other Arab countries.  They will come in with one set of impressions that pretty much demonize the other side and they leave realizing that the people they’ve met are just like they are in terms of having real hopes, real fears, having dreams, having a set of aspirations, wanting to live a normal life.  You have to be exposed to each other to come to appreciate that and we need to break down the psychological barriers. 

There are real barriers and there are psychological barriers especially between Israelis and Palestinians because they do live so closely together.  We need to break down the barriers.  One of the things that I think is remarkable in terms of proximity, just to give you a feel for how closely they live together, the Prime Minister of Israel lives in a place …800 meters from Kalkilya.  They live right next to each other and yet in some ways they’re miles apart and there has to be a way to break down those barriers.  There has to be way to affect how they see each other, how they deal with each other.  A remarkable transformation has taken place between the negotiators.  I will tell you that I oftentimes will have the negotiators together at my house and my family will look at them and see how they behave together and they’re family to each other, but that’s too limited and it’s been too isolated and it has to be broadened.

Q    With the administration that’s going to be elected tomorrow, do you anticipate a change with either of them?

A               I could answer this a lot of different ways and I’m going to answer it in the following way.  Every administration since Truman’s has defined Arab-Israeli peace as in the vital national security interest of the United States.  That’s a lot of administrations, Republican and Democrat, and my guess is that the kind of continuity that has characterized our policy over time on the issue of Arab-Israeli peace is something that will be maintained, regardless of who is elected.

Q.     Would you speak to the issue of Jerusalem for both the Palestinians and the Israelis

 in terms of historical context?

A.     Jerusalem is highly emotional for both sides.  One can do a kind of historical analysis and try to make a case, but there is a reality that you have to contend with and that reality is that both sides regard it as important.  When we were at Camp David and in the aftermath of Camp David we looked for ways to try to deal with the sets of considerations that existed on both side.  It’s always easy in a negotiation if you’re negotiating with yourself.  I haven’t lost too many of those when I’ve negotiated with myself.  Occasionally it might be tough, but when you have two perspectives, two needs, you have to see if there’s a way to reconcile them.  Sometimes there is, sometimes there isn’t, but I can tell you on this one you’re not going to convince the Palestinians that it’s not important to them.  By the same token no one is going to convince the Israelis that it isn’t important to them.   So the question is not to get into a debate over whether one side has a claim and the other doesn’t have a claim, the question is can you look at the problem and determine what is important to each side and is there a way to address it and if there is then you have a pathway to a solution.    If you ask me based on all the discussions we’ve had, there probably is a way to solve this. 

Q.        Is there a role for the United States in proposing a return of technical education to Palestinians?

A.     The short answer is yes.  The fact of the matter is when you have per capita income that is in relative terms as low as it is in the Territories you want to look for every conceivable way that you can build it up.  One thing about the Palestinian population is it is a highly educated one and they are devoted to emphasizing education.  The more that can be done in this area the better. 

            I’ve said before there have been a limited number of people-to-people programs that have been carried out and have been very successful, which is why I would like to see the door opened much broader for them.  A number of Israeli universities and Palestinian universities are linked together.  They have a  series of computer networks that are linked together and they engage in some educational sharing.  So, the more that can be done to promote that the better it is.  You actually have some American companies that have donated the computers to make it possible to build on that.  The more that we can do to deal with the information age to transfer those skills to introduce that into the West Bank and Gaza the better it’s going to be. We have made education one of the areas where in fact we do provide assistance.  There are a lot of areas where we provide assistance, but that’s one of them, but I also think it’s one that we and others can do more.  The European Union, as an example, supports the educational system among the Palestinians by paying Palestinian teachers.  That’s what I mean by saying there are a lot of different actors who can contribute and we don’t have a monopoly on it nor should we have a monopoly on it.  The rules that others play by ought to reflect their ability to contribute in a way that will make a difference.  The more we do in education the better it’s going to be.

Q.    Why did the President press for Camp David when there were indications that Arafat would not negotiate?

A.    Well, there were not indications that he would not negotiate.  He never said to us he wouldn’t negotiate.  He said he would have preferred that was more preparation for them, but I’ll explain what the nature of the problem was.  I touched on it earlier.  From basically May there was a negotiating channel in Sweden between the Israelis and Palestinians that we also took part in.  As long as it was done discretely they actually were beginning to make headway.  When it got exposed, then they stopped making headway.  Every meeting--and I was out there all the time, at that time I was out there all the time—at that time every single negotiating session we had produced increased bitterness, it didn’t produce results.  We had seen a forerunner of what we’re seeing today with what was noted as the “days of rage” in the middle of May, so we’re on a track where both sides were saying “You’ve got to do a whole deal and not a partial deal,” we were on a track where the negotiations were going nowhere.  That’s because they were focused on the permanent status issues and they couldn’t get below the level of generality and they wouldn’t accept that the leaders were engaged.  We tried everything we could throughout the month of June to see if there was some other way to begin to overcome the difficulties or tackle the problems from a different perspective and it became increasingly clear there was not.  We were headed towards the September date which the parties themselves had set in the Sharm agreement for when they were supposed to complete an agreement.  The pathway we’re on was one that was very clearly going to lead us towards a kind of deterioration and an explosion. So after a month of making a very intensive effort in every way we could to see if we could break the stalemate and get them beyond what I described before as a negotiation through slogans, we made the decision to have the leaders come on the grounds that these were the only ones who could change the dynamic and we did succeed in changing the dynamic.  The fact is, had we not gone to Camp David we would never (missing text - end of Side A)

Q.    What would be a solution that would be acceptable to both sides for Jerusalem?

A.   When Christiane Amanpour was interviewing Prime Minister Barak she asked him something similar to that and he said “I don’t think you’re a negotiator.”  I’m not suggesting you’re not a negotiator but I’m not going to negotiate the issue here.  And the reason I’m not going to negotiate the issue here is Jerusalem is one of those issues that is so sensitive, so difficult that there’s a limited number of possibilities that will work and if one begins to talk about those limited possibilities in public you’ll kill them before we ever have a chance to try to make them work.  So at this stage you’ll just have to accept the reality that I believe there is a solution there but I’m not going to discuss what I think it might be. 

Q.    Would you please address the role of the media as it pertains to the issues in Israel and Palestine?

A.    Always helpful.  Always.  I was serious when I said that.  This is a very hard negotiation because, unlike the original process of Oslo which truly did remain discrete--which was true for both the original Declaration of Principles and then what’s known as Oslo 2 which was actually an interim agreement of the end of September 1995--very little has remained private.  Now, the fact is that there’s so much out there that’s untrue means that some of the nuggets that are out there that are true people don’t really know.  But as I said before I gave the example, in May there was a discrete channel.  You cannot negotiate these kinds of core issues that are so sensitive, that expose leaders before their publics, except in private.  You can’t negotiate it publicly, it never works.  Each side then, when they’re exposed, they have to stake out a maximum position and then you can forget being able to move forward.  That channel was exposed and once it was exposed it ceased being effective.  The media has a job to do and they do it and somehow you have to strike a balance between what the parties themselves will do and what is exposed in a public fashion and when it’s exposed.  At a certain point everything has to be exposed and it has to be explained. 

            There are no such things as secret agreements.  They don’t exist.  Agreements can be negotiated in private but then they have to be explained in public. But they have to have a chance to be negotiated in private.  To be very honest, most of the media that I have dealt with over the years have been responsible.  They have a job to do but they’re not out there trying to make it impossible to do the job of making the negotiations work.

Q.    Would you please speak to the issue of how foreign aid, if any, has been siphoned into private pockets [by the Palestinian Authority]?  If that’s so, if we believe it’s so, what are we doing about it?

A.    Well, I can tell you in our case it is not so.  I can’t say in other cases, but I can explain why I can assure you that it’s not so.  We made a decision early on that we would provide assistance almost entirely through nongovernmental organizations for specific projects.  We would not give cash assistance; we would not give assistance directly to the Palestinian Authority.  Others have operated differently and I can’t tell you what’s happened with them but I can tell you that we operated on that basis because we felt the need to be able to ensure that the dollars that we’re providing were dollars that we could account for and went for the purpose that they were intended.  The only money we give today that goes to the Palestinian Authority is a very small part and it goes for specific projects related to rule of law because we would like them to institutionalize rule of law.  But this is a very minute part of what we provide.  Almost all of our assistance is through NGOs and is for project assistance.

Q.    How do you see the peace process continuing and the prospects for peace if the Labor government should fall?

A.    I’ve never found it really particularly fruitful to comment on the politics of any other country and certainly not to comment on the internal politics in Israel.  I prefer to sort of reiterate the point I made earlier.  There are certain realities that will govern any agreement with the Palestinians and the needs that exist that the Israelis have to have satisfied are not going to change and the needs that the Palestinians have, the needs that the Palestinians will require to be able to do an agreement are also fundamentally not going to change.  Those core needs on each side will determine what an agreement is that will basically shape what any government is going to be able to do or not do.  I’ve heard on one side or the other that maybe if you play for time things will get better.  Those realities aren’t going to change and it’s really a question of adjusting to those realities and whomever is in power is basically going to have to deal with those realities.  They’re not going to be able to adjust the realities—they going to have to adjust to the realities.

Q.    Would all of the things that have happened over the last several weeks have happened if General Sharon had not gone to the Temple Mount?

A.    Well, I laid out what the Palestinians think, which is that‘s what precipitated all this and I laid out what the Israelis think: they don’t believe that.  One thing is for sure.  There is a frustration and an anger on the Palestinian streets and it’s not artificial and it can’t be wished away.  How much of it is something that is encouraged is a different question.  I think what we have focused on is trying to get the Palestinians to live up to the commitments that they have made at Sharm and trying to get the Israelis to do likewise.  I think if both sides would carry out the commitments that they’ve made we would see the situation transformed.

Q.    Do you see the adoption of inter-negotiations in the area of human rights education in Israel and the rest of the Middle East?

A. Well, I think that has value internationally.  It’s not limited to here or to the Middle East.  I think it has application everywhere.  What I would like to see is continuing improvement in the educational curriculum and what is taught.  And here I will tell you, this is where there has to be a change in the Palestinian side.  You’re not going to produce peace if you don’t socialize attitudes in favor of peace.  And this is something that has to change.  It is something where there has to be much more of an effort made than has been made so far on their side.

Q.    Could there be some sort of a Marshal Plan financed by the United States and the oil-producing states that would affect the area and raise economic status in the area?

A    I think anything that would change the economic realities in the Territories would be a positive.  I think if the focus is only on the economic side it won’t be sufficient.  There is a political need and a political grievance that has to be addressed and so I think these two really have to go hand in hand.  If you deal only with the political and not the economic side then you don’t have the underpinning to sustain the political.  If you deal only with the economic and not the political side you’re not dealing with what is the core of the conflict.  So I think you need to do both.  I think, as I’ve said, one of the things that is troubling is that we’ve not been able to change the material circumstances in the territories in the way in which we certainly had hoped going back to 1993 with the original donors’ conference.

Q    Would you please describe from your point of view the comments that Chairman Arafat has made over the last few weeks to the English -speaking world and internally.

A      I’m not sure that I see a gap between what he says in the English-speaking world and to his own audiences.  I think what’s important, what we would like to see is more of an effort with his own public to do what he can to defuse the situation, to defuse the tensions.

Q    What has been discussed on the issue of the Dome of the Rock and the temple underneath?

A     Well, that was certainly one of the issues that was discussed at Camp David and it’s been one of the issues that we’ve dealt with since.  As I said, here you have something that is tremendously sensitive to both sides and it’s not going to be resolved unless it addresses both sides’ needs.  At the end of the day, we’re going to have to find a way that addresses both sides on this or you’re not going to have a solution.