Speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on April 30, 2001:

Ephraim Sneh
Minister of Transportation, Israel

  Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.  In order to better understand the current phase of our relations with the Palestinians we must have a sort of historic perspective, mainly of the last thirty-four, thirty-five years. If we divided [this into] two periods into two phases, we can see that ultimately we have a period of fighting and a period of negotiation.  From the Six-Day War in 1967 up to the Lebanon War in 1982, this was the era of terror and guerilla, which Israel had to confront.  After the invasion of Lebanon, between 1982 and 1987, we had what I call the years of confusion and exploration.  There were explorations between Israelis and Palestinians, a great deal facilitated by the U.S. administration, to try with the participation of the Jordanians, to work out an Israeli-Palestinian initial agreement.  It failed.  Then, in 1987, we had another period of violent confrontation.  This was the first intifada, and this period lasted five years - from 1987 to 1992.  From the end of 1992 to the end of the summer of the year 2000, we had the Oslo years, another period of negotiation, which was quite fruitful because it brought the first Oslo and second Oslo agreements and it laid the ground for a substantial Israeli-Palestinian agreement.  And then came a change, which started a new era of confrontation.  It happened at the end of September 2000, with the outbreak of the recent violent intifada.  So we had two periods of negotiations, two periods of time of military confrontation,  violent confrontation.  I’m sure that the end of the present phase we will have another round, another period of negotiations, which, hopefully, will end this time in a lasting peace agreement.

  What happened, what changed?  A year ago, I was quite optimistic. It was a time when we all had the impression that we were very, very close to striking a deal with the Palestinians.  The next phase which followed the talks last spring when I was here was the Camp David summit between Arafat and Barak.  I met Arafat just before he left for Camp David and I had the personal feeling that he was flying there in order to strike a deal.  More than that, Barak went up to the possible limits of Israeli concessions.  No one could offer to the Palestinians more than Barak did.  In the days of Camp David, we had this feeling that we were very close to concluding the Camp David talks with an agreement. [Then] came the change, and Arafat went to talk without signing an agreement. There were several attempts to renew this high-level negotiation but nothing came out of it. Arafat came to the conclusion that, through internationalization of the conflict, he may squeeze out of us more and more concessions. 

  Which concessions?  The first is about the holy shrines in Jerusalem.  The second is about what percentage of the West Bank he can get back from Israel, and the third one, which is the most important for us, I must say the most dangerous one, is the hope to achieve Israeli agreement to entrance of Palestinian refugees, mainly from Lebanon, to its territory--the return of the Palestinian refugees to the territory of the State of Israel.  What are the tactics of Arafat, or the strategy?  He believes that by resuming the violence and terrorism, Israel will sooner or later, and he hopes it will be sooner, act in what is called “excessive use of force,” or would commit a mistake by, for instance, hitting a hospital or a school or a school bus.  He hoped that Israel would commit a mistake that would serve as a pretext for bringing international forces to the West Bank and Gaza, replacing the Israeli troops there and finally imposing on Israel a solution which so far Israel has rejected. 

  These are the tactics, and it worked for a while.  When the real front is the CNN screen, [there is] a great advantage for the weaker side.  When the tank and the ambulance meet, the sympathy of the world goes with the ambulance, not with the tank.  We are the stronger side, that’s why he believed we would suffer from inferiority in the PR matter, and for a while he succeeded.  But I believe that the strategy of Israel is to put Arafat in front of a real decision, of a choice that the national leader can have once in a lifetime.  The fact that Israel went, as I said, to the maximum possible concession and offered it to Arafat, we made it very, very clear to international public opinion that he is the one who missed an opportunity to strike a deal with us and that he is responsible for the resumption of violence, the continuation of violence, and he is responsible for the fact that there is no peace agreement and I believe we succeeded in it. 

  So far, Arafat continues with violence, despite all you hear about explorations and talks and preliminary negotiations.  There is no clear order by Arafat to stop the violence abruptly, promptly and completely.  What is the danger here?  The danger is that conflict can be expanded to a broader-scale regional conflict.  And why?  The explanation is the following.  What our government - not only the government of Barak but also the strategy of Rabin, Peres and then Barak, what we succeeded in doing is to redivide the Middle East, to draw a new demarcation line.  No more Israel and all the other Arab countries.  No, it was the moderate countries [on one side], those states who are friendly with the United States, who are committed to the peace process; and on the other side of this demarcation line are the rogue regimes, the crazy states--Iran, Iraq--the terror organizations.  Of course, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey are quite remote from the scene of the confrontation, but those countries, the allies of the United States in the region, were on one side and Iran, Iraq and Syria were on the other side of this demarcation line. 

  Arafat, in his current policy, gives the rogue regimes, the radical, militant elements in the region a cause:  not only a pretext to expand the violence, but he gives them a cause which may serve as the unifying factor for the Arab world.  By raising the banner of the Palestinian problem which is unresolved yet, he succeeds so that even moderate Arab regimes would gradually be shifted to the positions of the hard liner. 

  So, a change in the regional configuration is one danger.  If you notice, the recent conference for solidarity with the Palestinians was held in Tehran, not in Cairo, not in Amman, not in Tunisia, but in Tehran, the capital of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in the region, maybe in the world.  Who hosted it?  The arch-terrorists.  The Ayatollah Khameini.  So, this is one danger.  The radicalization of the region.  As I said, there is another danger, more concrete, of expanding the conflict.  How can it be expanded?  Primarily by a new flare-up on the Israeli-Lebanese border and here, you know, Iran is standing behind the Hizbollah organization, the Lebanese militia which is sponsored, inspired, directed, trained, and financed by Iran.  This organization has a permanent license from Damascus to act in Lebanon and to act against Israel from Lebanon.  Actually, from a certain sector of the Israeli-Lebanese border.  The danger is that if the Syrians would allow Hizbollah to keep fighting beyond a certain red line then we will be forced to respond more harshly.  It may lead to a broader confrontation, and we have to be aware of it. 

  There are now new configurations, a new triangle - Iraq, Syria, Iran - here is growing cooperation between these three countries.  Syria, an old rival of Iraq, allows Iraqi oil to be shipped through Syria to the Mediterranean seaports of Syria.  This means another 50 million dollars for the coffers of Saddam Hussein.  There is more and more diplomatic cooperation, even strategic cooperation [among] these three countries.  Saddam Hussein publicly said that he would serve as the strategic backing for Syria - if a military confrontation with Israel would occur.  We have to be aware of this dangerous triangle. It may have a meaning in the case of that kind of confrontation. 

  We have to understand why Jordan and Egypt are so active in the attempt to put an end to the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation.  They understand exactly what I explained - that in the long-run, radicalization of the region, keeping the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the level of military conflict, not a diplomatic negotiation, may radicalize their own societies.  They would be forced to take sides. They do not want to find themselves together with Iran and Iraq.  That’s why they’re so actively trying to solve the problem - to submit to the process their own initiative.  The spirit - the letter of the Egyptian-Jordanian formula - is not balanced, is not good enough. We cannot accept it.  It’s not that it’s not good enough, but it’s not balanced.  It says exactly what Israel has to do immediately.  It speaks in a very generalized language, without any time-table as to what the Palestinians have to do in order to stop the violence.  We can hope that if they accept some amendments that Shimon Peres recently suggested to them, this Jordanian-Egyptian initiative can be more helpful. 

  A few words about the role of the United States.  The United States is needed as a mediator because we can talk directly to Arafat.  The United States can support the moderate allies in the region - to keep them from going to the side of the extremists, of the rogue regimes, of the enemies of peace.  The United States can encourage its allies to be more active, more helpful for the resumption of talks and putting an end to the violence.  If all this doesn’t happen, Israel may face a long-term conflict.  We are fully aware that there will be no change in the positions of Arafat.  We may have to stand in that sort of confrontation for a year or more.  I hope next spring when I am here to be more optimistic, as I was last year.  Thank you very much.